Creating Real Carbon Credits

The principle of Supplementarity within the Kyoto Protocol means that internal abatement of emissions should take precedence before a country buys in carbon credits. However it also established the Clean Development Mechanism as a Flexible Mechanism by which capped entities could develop real, measurable, permanent emissions reductions voluntarily in sectors outside the cap. Many criticisms of carbon credits stem from the fact that establishing that an emission of CO₂-equivalent greenhouse gas has truly been reduced involves a complex process. This process has evolved as the concept of a carbon project has been refined over the past 10 years.

The first step in determining whether or not a carbon project has legitimately led to the reduction of real, measurable, permanent emissions is understanding the CDM methodology process. This is the process by which project sponsors submit, through a Designated Operational Entity (DOE), their concepts for emissions reduction creation. The CDM Executive Board, with the CDM Methodology Panel and their expert advisors, review each project and decide how and if they do indeed result in reductions that are additional.

Additionality and its importance

It is also important for any carbon credit (offset) to prove a concept called additionality. The concept of additionality addresses the question of whether the project would have happened anyway, even in the absence of revenue from carbon credits. Only carbon credits from projects that are "additional to" the business-as-usual scenario represent a net environmental benefit. Carbon projects that yield strong financial returns even in the absence of revenue from carbon credits; or that are compelled by regulations; or that represent common practice in an industry are usually not considered additional, although a full determination of additionality requires specialist review.

It is generally agreed that voluntary carbon offset projects must also prove additionality in order to ensure the legitimacy of the environmental stewardship claims resulting from the retirement of the carbon credit (offset). According the World Resources Institute/World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WRI/WBCSD) : "GHG emission trading programs operate by capping the emissions of a fixed number of individual facilities or sources. Under these programs, tradable 'offset credits' are issued for project-based GHG reductions that occur at sources not covered by the program. Each offset credit allows facilities whose emissions are capped to emit more, in direct proportion to the GHG reductions represented by the credit. The idea is to achieve a zero net increase in GHG emissions, because each tonne of increased emissions is 'offset' by project-based GHG reductions. The difficulty is that many projects that reduce GHG emissions (relative to historical levels) would happen regardless of the existence of a GHG program and without any concern for climate change mitigation. If a project 'would have happened anyway,' then issuing offset credits for its GHG reductions will actually allow a positive net increase in GHG emissions, undermining the emissions target of the GHG program. Additionality is thus critical to the success and integrity of GHG programs that recognize project-based GHG reductions."

Criticisms

The Kyoto mechanism is the only internationally agreed mechanism for regulating carbon credit activities, and, crucially, includes checks for additionality and overall effectiveness. Its supporting organisation, the UNFCCC, is the only organisation with a global mandate on the overall effectiveness of emission control systems, although enforcement of decisions relies on national co-operation. The Kyoto trading period only applies for five years between 2008 and 2012. The first phase of the EU ETS system started before then, and is expected to continue in a third phase afterwards, and may co-ordinate with whatever is internationally agreed at but there is general uncertainty as to what will be agreed in Post–Kyoto Protocol negotiations on greenhouse gas emissions. As business investment often operates over decades, this adds risk and uncertainty to their plans. As several countries responsible for a large proportion of global emissions (notably USA, Australia, China) have avoided mandatory caps, this also means that businesses in capped countries may perceive themselves to be working at a competitive disadvantage against those in uncapped countries as they are now paying for their carbon costs directly.

A key concept behind the cap and trade system is that national quotas should be chosen to represent genuine and meaningful reductions in national output of emissions. Not only does this ensure that overall emissions are reduced but also that the costs of emissions trading are carried fairly across all parties to the trading system. However, governments of capped countries may seek to unilaterally weaken their commitments, as evidenced by the 2006 and 2007 National Allocation Plans for several countries in the EU ETS, which were submitted late and then were initially rejected by the European Commission for being too lax.

A question has been raised over the grandfathering of allowances. Countries within the EU ETS have granted their incumbent businesses most or all of their allowances for free. This can sometimes be perceived as a protectionist obstacle to new entrants into their markets. There have also been accusations of power generators getting a 'windfall' profit by passing on these emissions 'charges' to their customers. As the EU ETS moves into its second phase and joins up with Kyoto, it seems likely that these problems will be reduced as more allowances will be auctioned.